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Post - Settlement Settlements:
Agreeing to Make Resolutions

Efficient
Robert W. Mendenhair

I. INTRODUCTION
Post-settlement settlements' is a dispute resolution method designed to
increase the efficiency and profitability of settlement agreements.' Simply put,
the idea is for parties in conflict2 to negotiate a settlement as best they can.'
Then, the parties ask an expert third party to use analytical methods to improve
on the quality of the agreement for both sides.4 In dispute resolution literature,
this joint improvement of the agreement is termed "expanding the pie" or
discovering opportunities for joint gains.' While the third party's improvements
may be substantial, the conflicting parties do not accept any new proposal by the
intervenor unless both prefer it to their initial agreement.6
The purpose of this article is to more fully describe the concept of postsettlement settlements, to discuss the assumptions upon which it is based, to
critique the concept, and to make proposals that will assist third-party intervenors
in achieving advantageous post-settlement settlements. Since the goal of post-

* Will & Trust Planning Consultant at CIBC Trust Corporation in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada;
LL.B. (1985) - College of Law, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; LL.M. (1995)
- J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. My thanks to Professor
Gerald R, Williams and the students of the Advanced Negotiations seminar for their helpful insights
and critiques. But, an especial thanks to my family for their cooperation and support in helping me
realize my desire to return to Brigham Young University for further studies.
1. Howard Raiffa developed the concept of post-settlement settlements in his article PostSettlement Settlements. The concept finds an earlier genesis in Raiffa's book, THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF NEGOTIATION where, in the context of mediation, Raiffa speaks of using a strong mediator, called
a "contract embellisher," to use analytical methods to maximize the joint gains for both sides. See
Howard Raiffa, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 221 (1982) [hereinafter ART AND SCIENCE];
Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, 11 NEGOTiATION JOURNAL - ON TIE PROCESS OF
DISPUIE SErIIEMENT 9 (1985) [hereinafter Post-Settlement Settlements].

1.
2.

Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 2, at 9-10.
I will use "conflict" throughout this paper in its wider meaning of an opposition of interests,

and not in its more limited meaning of an open fight or struggle. See "conflict" in WEBSTR'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 298 (2d ed. 1980).
3. Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 2, at 9.
4. Id. at 9-10.
5. Id. at 9; RAFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 131-32; DAVID A- LAX & JAMES K
SEBENIU, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR 32 (1986).
6. Raifs, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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settlement settlements is to increase conflicting parties' joint gains, the concept
of joint gains must first be addressed.

II. UNDERSTANDING JOiNT GAiNS
This article undertakes two efforts in an attempt to explain the idea of joint
gains clearly and concisely. First, it will divide joint gains into two sections: one
dealing with the objectives of joint gains and the other dealing with the process
of joint gains.' This division facilitates a rational organization of the idea's
underlying notions. Second, the article will use a simple, precise working
vocabulary to explain joint gains. In particular, the use of multiple terms to
express the same idea or notion9 will be avoided, a definite obstacle to the
uninitiated in this area.
A. Objectives of Joint Gains
Value is the most basic notion to joint gains'0 and, in this context, has its
broadest possible meaning. Typically, value is understood to mean the monetary
worth of an object." Thus, if persons were to value a certain object, their
natural inclination would be to state that the object is worth a certain dollar
2
amount. Commonly, this type of value is called market value.1 Now, if persons
were asked to value a certain object, but limited to non-monetary descriptions of
value, they would likely describe the object's desirability, usefulness, or

7. RAIFA, AYT AND ScuNcE, supra note 2, at 219; Raiff, Post-Settlenent Setlements. supra
note 2, at 9; NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MUTUAL GAIN: TE BASIC SEMINAR OF THE PROGRAM
ON NEGOTIATION AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 14 (Lavina Hall ed., 1993) [hereinafter NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES].

8. The author is unaware of any negotiation literature that draws a distinction between the
objectives and the process of joint gains as he has done. However, the author has personally found
the distinction helpful in understanding joint gains.
9. Alternative terms, phrases and expressions for the ideas and notions presented will be set out
in the footnotes. This will assist readers who use this explanation of joint gains as a beginning point
for further research.
10. Some authors use the idea of a party's interests as the fundamental notion in achieving joint
gains. However, interests arise from the values persons place on items or situations. See LAX &
SEBENIUS, supra note 7 at 63 (1986), there the authors speak of assessing the relative importance of
interests and assessing trade-offs.
I. See "value," WEBsTER's NEW WoRLD DICTIONARY 1568 (2d ed. 1980)(note the strong
emphasis on monetary references and market valuation).
12. This type of value is also termed quantitative value because the person making the value
judgment sets an amount, or quantifies the value of an item in terms of what it can be exchanged for.
This broad definition is inclusive of both the bartering situation and the more familiar retail setting
where money is exchanged for an item. In an effort to simplify, the author has chosen to use the more
familiar "market value."
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importance.

3

This type of value is termed "intrinsic value," and it is the esteem

held for an item as opposed to its monetary worth. 4

In the language ofjoint gains, value includes both market value and intrinsic
value.' 5 Beyond attaching value to objects, people can also ascribe value to

situations - the life circumstances in which they find themselves.' 6 Generally,
they use expressions of intrinsic value to communicate the value of certain

situations, but ascribing market value to situations is not entirely uncommon.

7

Remembering the broad scope of value is critical to fully grasping the objective

of joint gains.
The objective of joint gains is to increase the total shared value that parties
to a conflict realize in the settlement of their conflict. 8 This is the gain we refer

to in joint gains. Also, as the term infers, all parties must realize this increase in
value simultaneously, and one party cannot have their value in the settlement
increased at the expense of any other party.' 9 The ultimate culmination of this
objective is to have the parties realize all possible joint gains; that is, to reach a

settlement that has no other alternative settlement producing greater joint
for the parties. 20 At this point, the settlement has become
improvement
2
efficient. '

13. See "value," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (1990).
14. A good example is the statement, "There is value in my home!" Some might interpret this
statement to mean that one's house has considerable market value. The same statement, when
understood to mean intrinsic value, can be interpreted to mean one's family relationships are good and
they contribute to one's well-being.
15. Market value can actually be seen as a subset of intrinsic value. That is, even market value
ismerely the quantification of the intrinsic value of an item. The distinction is made in this paper to
ensure that the broadest meaning possible is given to value. Market value and intrinsic value are
equivalent to what Raiffa describes as quantitative trade-offs and qualitative trade-offs. See the
discussion of AMPO Versus City in RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 2, at 133-47, but especially
noting 145-47.
16. RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENC, supra note 2,at 131-31, 145-47; LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note
7 at 75, 77.
17. Seeking compensation for personal injuries is a common form of ascribing a market value
or money to a changed life situation.
18. RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supranote 2, at 131-31; LAx & SEBENIErS, supra note 7, at 8889.
19. RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 2, at131-32.
20. Id. at 139.
21. Id Several terms and phrases are used synonymously with "efficient" when referring to such
settlements. An Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto, applied the concept of efficiency to economic
theory. Thus, efficient settlements are often referred to as Pareto optimal settlements. Id.; LAx &
SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 44. As well, since value is the "pie" to be divided in the settlement of a
conflict, an efficient agreement is said to leave no pie on the negotiating table. RAIFFA, ART AND
SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 139. Lastly, the settlement of a conflict is often referred to as an agreement,
referring to the end legal product of a settlement. Thus, an efficient settlement may be referred to as
an efficient agreement or a Pareto optimal agreement Id. The phraseology and terms used to denote
an efficient settlement can be interchanged and combined in several different ways so that even further
hybrids are possible. This increases the importance of having the concept of efficient settlements
firmly in mind.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1996, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 6
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 1996, No. I
A common error is to assume that only one efficient settlement exists in any
given conflict.22 This is not so. Several efficient agreements generally exist in

any conflict. 3 If the parties realize and apportion all possible value to one or the
other of the parties, the crux of the idea of efficiency, they can apportion the value
unequally should they choose to do so.24 Remember that efficiency means that
the parties have realized and apportioned all possible joint gains despite whether

they apportion the joint gains equally.25
Fairness in the apportionment of joint gains exhibits all the complications

normally seen in determining fairness. What is fair depends on the criteria
used.26 If the parties bring the same amount of value to the negotiation, the

parties or intervenors may equally apportion the value createdby settlement on the
basis that equality is also equitable in this situation. However, achieving an
equitable solution often requires an unequal apportionment of the value createdby
the settlement. Like the assessment of value itself, fairness is highly subjective

and often difficult to quantify.
In this section, the article has set out the definition of value and its broad
meaning in joint gains, inclusive of both market value and intrinsic value. The
article also has addressed that joint gain is a simultaneous increase in value by the
parties to the conflict. A realization of all potential joint gains results in an
efficient settlement, though the parties may not apportion the value created by the
settlement equally between themselves.
B. The Process of Joint Gains
As with any ideal goal or objective, parties to a conflict will often not
accomplish the objective of achieving efficient settlements. Yet, in employing the
process of joint gains and striving for the ideal objective, parties in conflict can
attain as efficient agreements as possible, given the parties' resources and skills
as negotiators. The process of joint gains must now be explored.
The process of joint gains is most succinctly described as the matching of
complementary values.2 This process is not so much the matching of similar
types of values' 8 as it is the matching of any values that produce a tradeoff value,
as perceived by the parties to the conflict.29 Tradeoff value is a conclusion

22. Generally, we equate an "efficient" settlement to the "best" settlement Once we do this we
import notions of fairness and equity. Efficiency, as described here is not concerned with fairness or
equity in the distribution of value. Rather, the only concern of efficiency is that all possible value is
created and allocated to one or other of the parties to the conflict.
23. RAIFFA, ART AND SciENCE, supra note 1, at 139, 160-64; LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 1,
at 44.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 150-52.
27. Id at 42, 92-93, 105. This process is also referred to as the linking of issues. Id. at 236-37.
28. The matching of a market value to a market value or an intrinsic value to an intrinsic value.
29. Id

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss1/6

4

Mendenhalt: Medenhalt: Post-Settlement Settlements:
Post - Settlement Settlements

1996]

reached when making a comparison for the purpose of exchanging items or
situations, or a combination of the two.3 0 The decision facing each party is
whether the exchange of the items or situations gives them value compared to
another possible trade, or no trade at all.3 If the party concludes that the
exchange realizes value for them, the exchange creates tradeoff value for that
party. 2 The usual way of expressing this tradeoff value is to state the value they
value
receive for the item or situation exchanged. When all parties see tradeoff
33
in a particular exchange, the exchange, of course, is likely to occur.
Matching complementary values is an accomplishable, yet difficult, task.3
The process becomes even more difficult when accurate information is not
available concerning the parties' values. 5 Generally, this difficulty arises from
the decision of one party or both parties to engage in competitive behavior.36
Strategic misrepresentationand partial disclosure characterizecompetitivebehavior
as each party attempts to "bring their opponent to their senses" and have their
opponent see tradeoff value on their terms.37 The parties also feel that if they
truly set out their values other parties to the conflict will exploit the information
and take advantage of them. 38 That is, the other parties will also act
competitively and use the information of the other's values to make greater gains
at the expense of the disclosing party.
Truth-telling and full disclosure, on the other hand, characterize cooperative
negotiation behavior. 39 This type of behavior is most conducive to realizing joint
gains since the parties expose and explore all issues in the conflict."0 In
By
particular, conflicting parties reveal their true values to each other.4
matching one or more issues on which the parties' values differ, the parties can

30. Id. at 74-77.
31. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 89 (where joint gains are expressed in terms of three
joint actions, each a progression of joint gains from the no agreement situation to the efficient
agreement).
32.
33.

Id. at 74-77.
Id.

34.

Id. at 90-112.

35.

Id. at 34-35, 121-22, 139-41.

36. RAIFFA, ART AND ScIENcE, supra note 1, at 33. Competitive negotiation behavior is also
termed "distributional bargaining." Competitive behavior is often exhibited in single issue, distributive
situations where one party's gain necessarily comes at the expense of another party. Id Another
reference to competitive behavior is "value-claiming" behavior since the object of the parties' conduct

is to acquire as much value as possible. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 32-33.
37. Id at 34-35, 121-23.
38. Id.
39. RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 131. Cooperative negotiation behavior is also
referred to as integrative bargaining. Like distributional bargaining, the appellation is derived from
bargaining situations where the behavior occurs most frequently. An integrative bargaining situation
is a multi-issue conflict where the parties are not strictly competitors, that is, all parties can gain value
rather than one party only gains at the expense of another. Id Cooperative behavior also is "valuecreating" behavior since it is more explorative of values. See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 30-32.

40.

Id. at 30-32.

41.

Id
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engineer an exchange where each party gains value on an issue or issues to which
it ascribes great value, and the other parties do not, in exchange for the other
parties gaining value on other issues.42 Obviously, the parties must trust each
other not to act competitively and exploit the information for their own singular
gain, but to act cooperatively.43
The choice that the parties make to act competitively or cooperatively is not
as stark as represented. The choice of negotiating behavior by the parties is more
on a behavioral continuum with competitive and cooperative behavior being at
opposite ends of the spectrum." The process of joint gains requires that the
parties choose behavior that encourages the greatest degree of truth-telling and
disclosure possible.4" In other words, the parties must choose cooperative
negotiating behavior to realistically hope to realize all possible joint gains.46
The ironic twist to this choice of negotiating behavior, as discussed, is that
eventually the negotiating behavior must turn to apportioning the value that the
cooperative behavior has succeeded in creating. 4" Claiming value often results
in competitive behavior.48 Thus, in the process of joint gains, a healthy tension
exists between postponing competitive behavior to realize all possible joint gains
and knowing when to claim the value that they have created.49 This tension is
often termed the "negotiators' dilemma.""5
This section reveals the process of joint gains as primarily the matching of
complementary values. The ability of the parties to discover complementary
values is highly dependent on the negotiating behavior of the parties. More
cooperativebehavior, as opposed to competitivebehavior, enhances the joint gains
process by revealing the parties' true values as to the items or situations that are
at issue. Thejoint gains process must eventually end in the apportioning of value,
a step that often encourages competitivebehaviorby the parties. Thus, an ongoing
tension in the joint gains process is the postponing of competitive behavior and the
eventual need to apportion the value which cooperative behavior has created.

42. Id. at 88-90.
43. Id. at 33-35, 154-155.
44. This is another way of viewing the linked parts of negotiation-value creating and value
claiming. In a negotiation, the negotiators have the opportunity to, and in fact must, move through
the spectrum. They do, however, also have the opportunity to choose the specific tactics they employ.
See id. and discussion below.
45. Id. at 30-32.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 33-35.
48. Id.
49. A fatal response to the absolute requirement that value eventually be claimed is to heighten
commitment to cooperative behavior. This permits another party to claim value, without restraint, to
his unfair advantage and at the expense of parties that do not engage in claiming value.
50. Id. at 33-34, 38-42.
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A case example is helpful in clarifying the ideas central to joint gains. The
example in this article draws on the negotiation problem of Orin Parker v.
Dynamic Electronics,Inc.5 ' The full negotiation problem will not be replicated
here, only facts sufficient to exemplify joint gains.
A. The Facts of the Case
Orin Parker is an electronics whiz.12 Since high school, Parker has teamed
up with Charles Decker, a boyhood friend, in business ventures in the electronics
industry.53 Initially, the two carried on business as an informal partnership and,
during this period of informal partnership, Parker designed and patented a power
diode.54 When they combined the power diode with a power generator, also of
Parker's own design, the two partners manufactured a power generator superior
to any other generator on the market."
The business flourished with this new product and Parker and Decker decided
to incorporate as Dynamic Electronics, Inc. ("Dynamric").

6

Parker and Decker

were allocated equal shares in the company, some 50,000 participating and voting
shares.57 Both sat on the board of directors, rotating the position of chairman.5"
Both were employed as officers of the corporation taking their respective turns in
the offices of president and vice-president.5 9 At incorporation, Parker signed an
agreement stating that all designs, developments, and inventions created by him
in the future belonged to Dynamic. 6 The agreement did not mention the power
diode patent or the design of the power generator developed by Parker before the
date of incorporation.'

After some years of successful business, Dynamic experienced a downturn
for the following reasons: (1) rising costs, (2) major spending cutbacks by
customers, (3) erosion of the domestic market, and (4) introduction of newer, more
advanced products by competitors. 62 A serious disagreement arose between

51. Gerald R. Williams, Parker v. Dynamic Electronic, Inc. (Nov. 14, 1994) (unpublished
negotiation exercise on file with the author, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University,
Provo Utah) [hereinafter Parker v. Dynamicl. Used with the permission of Gerald R. Williams.
52. Id.; General Information for plaintiff and defendant's attorneys 1 [hereinafter General

Information].
53. General Information, supra note 53, at 1.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id
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Parker and Decker about how to handle the problem.63 Parker felt that the
company should move into the growing export market where their products would
still be in demand.' Decker viewed new technological advances as the key to
recovery, provided Parker could produce the desired results. 65 Further, Decker
argued that Dynamic should delay entry into the export markets until the domestic
market firmed up."
At this time, Parker also had been developing an improved capacitance meter
and had patented the crucial first stage of development. 67 However, the next
stage of development had been eluding him for some time and he was frustrated
by the whole problem."
Amid this tension, Parker and Decker held a directors' meeting.69 An
acrimonious fight broke out and the meeting ended with Parker walking out.7"
The next day Parker resigned as a director and Decker fired Parker as vicepresident of Dynamic.7 A few days later, Parker appeared at a scheduled
shareholders' meeting, but Decker failed to appear, most likely to prevent Parker
from taking his turn as chair of the board.72
A frustrated Parker decided to sell his shares in Dynamic and, according to
the terms of the corporate bylaws, the company exercised its right of first refusal
to purchase the shares.73 Parker offered to accept forty dollars per share;
Dynamic countered with an offer of twenty dollars per share.74 Parker filed suit
seeking various kinds of relief, all of which would allow him to disentangle
himself from Dynamic and receive a payout on his shares.75
B. Case Issues
Obviously, the conflict is very complex with many issues in contention.
Each of these issues is examined in greater detail below.

63. Id
64. Id.; see also id. at 2, (confidential Instructions for attorney representing defendants Dynamic
Electronics and Decker 7)[hereinafter Defendant's Instructions].
65. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 7.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Confidential Instructions for attorney representing the plaintiff Parker 6 [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Instructions].
68. Id.
69. Id.; General Information, supra note 53, at 2.
70. General Information, supra note 53, at 2.
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; see also id at 2; Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 3; Defendant's Instructions,
supra note 65, at 3.
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1. Valuation of Parker's Shares
Taken alone, the valuation of Parker's shares is highly distributive and
competitive. Parker desired to receive a price as great as possible, while Dynamic,
76
now under Decker's sole direction, wanted to pay as little as possible.
Dynamic, having exercised its right of first refusal, was under a legal obligation
to purchase Parker's shares. 77 Though it offered twenty dollars per share, it
realizes it would need to pay between twenty-four dollars and thirty-four per
share.78 Any lesser amount paid for shares would represent money well invested,
while a larger amount would be a poor investment. 9
Parker, on the other hand, had three experts value the shares at thirty-four,
twenty-eight, and twenty-four per share.80 Realistically, Parker felt that the
outcome at a trial would be between the two higher figures.8 He also knew that
another Dynamic employee dismissed at the same time received twenty-four per
share for his shares, which were participating, but not voting, shares." In
addition, a venture capitalist verbally offered forty per share to Parker for his
shares.' 3 However, the offer was conditional on Parker transferring the shares
free and clear, something Parker was unable to do as Dynamic exercised its right
to purchase the shares.' In total, Parker just wanted the best price he could get
for the shares and any amounts received pursuant to a settlement would have its
own face value.S
2. Claim for Lost Salary
Another complex issue in the negotiation between Parker and Dynamic
involves Parker's claim for lost salary. Parker lost six months of wages following

76. General Information, supra note 53, at 2; Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 3;
Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 3.
79. See Parker v. Dynamic; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 4. Below are the
evaluations done by the parties as expressed in their cost/benefit calculations. This gives some flavor
of the intense evaluation that should be performed by each party to the conflict. Thus, Dynamic's cost
of settlement on the share issue is as follows:
Cost to Dynamic
Payment per share
0.75 x total payment
< $24 per share
1.0 x total payment
$24 to $34 per share
1.5 x total payment
> $34 per share
80. Plaintiffs Instructions, supra note 68, at 4.
81. Id.
82. General Information, supra note 53, at 1; Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 4;
Defendant's Instructions, supra note 68, at 4.
83. PlaintifFs Instructions, supra note 68, at 4; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 4.
84. Id.
85. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 4.
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his dismissal, despite his best efforts to obtain alternate employment.' As vicepresident, Parker had earned $70,000 per year plus benefits and bonuses.' The
office of president, which he was to assume shortly, earned a salary of $80,000
per year plus benefits and bonuses. Parker felt he was entitled to a claim for
$40,000 plus bonuses.8s
Dynamic's position was that Parker was dismissed for just cause and was not
entitled to a claim for lost salary." However, if he were entitled to such a claim,
Parker's inability to find work for six months was surprising given the current
demand for electrical engineers. 90 As well, Dynamic paid no bornuses to officers
of Dynamic and, therefore, Dynamic felt that Parker was not entitled to any
bonuses.9"
Dynamic felt it could make some gain on this issue, as Dynamic was entitled
to a tax deduction of twenty-eight percent for amounts paid for salary.9 This
type of deduction was not available on other amounts paid to Parker, such as for
purchase of shares.93 If the company did not have to admit liability, Dynamic
was willing to channel some funds from share purchases to Parker's claim for lost
wages.94 One critical factor to remember is that Dynamic could only make the
deduction for salary paid as reasonable compensation. 95 If the amount deducted
was unreasonable, Dynamic would lose the deduction and be subject to
penalties.96 The company considered anything more than $100,000 unreasonable,
as it would be subject to an increased risk of an audit.97
3. Covenant Not to Compete
During the negotiation, the issue of whether Parker should agree to a
covenant not to compete was also discussed in detail. Within the industry, Parker
enjoyed an excellent reputation as an experienced electrical engineer and
innovator."s His reputation, and the fact that he had not already signed a
covenant not to compete with Dynamic, made Parker very hesitant to make such

86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
89. Id.; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 4.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id.; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 5.
96. Id.
97. Id. The costs of settlement to Dynamic in this area are assessed as follows:
Cost to Dynamic
Payment by Dynamic
.72 x payment
< $100,00
.75 x payment
$100,001 to $200,000
.80 x payment
> $200,000
98. Id; Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 4.
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an agreement. 99

However, Dynamic asserted that Parker had a duty not to

compete because of his former positions with Dynamic as an officer and
director." 0 Dynamic believed it had somewhere between a thirty and a fifty
percent chance of establishing this duty at trial.1. °
Parker did not compete with Dynamic in his employment at the time of the
negotiation, but this would have changed had he accepted a pending offer for
Employment with a
employment from one of Dynamic's competitors."
competitor would raise Parker's present wage of $80,000 to $90,000, plus
additional stock benefits. 13 Since the competitor was willing to leave the offer
of employment open for a year or two, the possibility existed that Parker could
wait out a covenant to compete and still move to the competitor.10 4
Dynamic felt that it must obtain a covenant not to compete because the
financial consequences of not doing so are enormous."°5 It was estimated that
Dynamic would lose a net present value of $200,000 if Parker competed against
them."° Moreover, Dynamic realized that any legal position it chose to argue
could not guarantee the creation of a valid covenant not to compete. The company
could only argue that Parker had an implied duty not to compete against his
former employer." 7
4. Rights to Power Diode and Generator
Since the power diode and generator had been good money-makers for
Dynamic, the division of the rights to these products was also discussed during the
negotiation.'0 8 Both Parker and Dynamic expected sales to drop significantly

99. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 5; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 5.
100. Id.; Plaintiffs Instructions, supra note 68, at 4.
101. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra not 68, at 4; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 3.
102. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 5; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 5.

103. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 5.
104.

Parker v. Dynamic. Parker assesses the covenant not to compete as follows:

Covenant by Parker
No covenant
1 year covenant

Benefit to Parker
$50,000
$30,000 plus payment

$20,000 plus payment
2 year covenant
$10,000 plus payment
3 year covenant
Payment
> 3 year covenant
105. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3. Dynamic's gains and losses would be:
Cost to Dynamic
Covenant by Parker
$200,000
No covenant
$150,000 plus payment
1 year covenant
$100,000 plus payment
2 year covenant
$50,000 plus payment
3 year covenant
Payment
> 3 year covenant
108. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 5; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 6.
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within the next year as technological advances made the products obsolete.' 9
At the time of negotiation, the net present value of profits arising from sales of
the product for the next three years, the life expectancy of the product, was
$105,000."0 To settle the dispute over the rights to the product, Dynamic or
Parker would need to pay the other for the rights to the product.'
Parker realized the limited life of the product, but was quite confident of his
chances at trial of obtaining a favorable outcome." 2 He wanted Dynamic to pay
products and estimated the net present value of
handsomely for his rights in the
3
the products to be $35,000.1
5. Rights to Work in Progress
Beyond the rights to the power diode and generator, Parker and Dynamics
also addressed their rights to the capacitance meter. This issue concerned an
improved capacitance meter that Parker was developing just before leaving
Dynamic." 4 Parker completed the first phase of the project before his departure,
and Dynamic patented the technology." 5 Parker, after his dismissal, made a
6
breakthrough and applied for a patent for this second phase of technology."
Unfortunately, the total package for the capacitance meter still relied on the first
phase, for which Dynamic still held the patent." 7 Parker had the new meter
evaluated and8 all indications were that it presented an unusually attractive
opportunity.1
Gaining rights to the capacitancemeter was particularly important for Parker.
To market the product, he must obtain rights from Dynamic to the first phase
patent." 9 As well, he must not have any constraints on his ability to market the
meter outside the United States (i.e., no covenant not to compete that is effective
beyond United States borders), and he would have to give up his job offer from

109. Id.
110. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 6.
111. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 6; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 6.
Dynamic's alternatives and costs are:
Cost to Dynamic
Agreement
$105,000 - payment
Sell rights to Parker
Payment
Buy rights from Parker
112. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 6.
113. Parker v. Dynamic, supra note 52. Parker's evaluation results in the following:
Benefit to Parker
Agreement
Payment
Sell rights to Dynamic
$35,000 - Payment
Buy rights from Dynamic
114. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 6; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 7.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Dynamic's competitor. 20 Parker saw three alternatives: (1) sell the rights to the
second phase to Dynamic, (2) buy the phase one rights from Dynamic, or (3) enter
The net present value of the
into a licensing agreement with Dynamic.'
breakthrough technology was $240,000.122

Dynamic realized that Parker's new capacitancemeter was directed at export
markets, a direction the company was not enthusiastic about taking. 2 3 However,
the company was suspicious that the new product also required the underlying
technology of phase one, to which it held the rights. 2 4 Dynamic saw four
alternatives: (1) refuse to license the phase one technology and gain a profit from
cutting off this competition in the export market, (2) sell its phase one technology
and use the money for research and development of more profitable products, (3)
new meter, or (4) grant a license to
obtain a license from Parker
2 and market the

Parker and take a royalty. 1

6. Litigation Expenses
At the time of the negotiation, Parker and Dynamic spent $120,000 in
attorney fees, expert witness costs, and other litigation expenses. 2 6 Both
and Parker knew they would spend a similar amount if the conflict went
Dynamic
27
to trial.1

120. Id
121. Plaintif's Instructions, supra note 65, at 6,7.
122. Plaintiff's Instructions, supra note 68, at 7. In summary, Parker's alternatives have the
following benefits or costs:
Benefit to Parker
Agreement
None
Dynamic keeps phase one rights
Parker buys phase one rights and
$240,000- payment
competes outside the U.S.
Dynamic licenses second phase
$100,000 + payment
technology and Parker gets 4 profit
Parker licenses phase one
$120,000 - payment
technology and markets meter.
123. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 7.
124. Id.
125. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 7-8. Dynamic's evaluation:
Benefit to Dynamic
Agreemen
$30,000
(1)Keep phase one rights
(2)$ell rights; allow Parker to
compete and obtain R&D money.

Up to $100,000, payment x 1.5;
plus amount > $100,000, but
< $130,000 x 1.3;
plus any amount > $130,000.
$72,000 - payment
$60,000 + payment

(3)Dynamic licenses breakthrough
(4)Parker licenses phase one
126. General Information, supra note 53, at 3.
127. Plaintiffs Instructions, supra note 68, at 3; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 68, at 3.
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C. Illustration of Joint Gains
The purpose of this section is not to construct an efficient agreement, but to
illustrate the concept of joint gains through a discussion of the negotiation case
example. The notion of value is apparently quite straightforward in the case
example because most of the issues are reduced to monetary terms. Parker and
Dynamic have closely evaluated their positions and determined the monetary
consequences of each potential resolution, whether it be share purchase price,
patent rights to the power diode and power generator, covenants not to compete,
or other issues.
The case example, however, also illustrates the importance of intrinsic value.
For example, though Dynamic had an opportunity to cooperate with Parker in the
marketing of his new capacitance meter and make some profit, the anticipated
market for the product was the export market. 128 Whether Dynamic should
further enter the export market was the crux of the original dispute between
Decker and Parker.129 For Dynamic to now enter the export market under
Decker's direction was quite incongruous. Putting monetary considerations aside,
Decker's attempt to cause Dynamic to make a further entrance into the export
market was a huge psychological barrier for dynamic to overcome.
This negotiation case example also illustrates the potential for joint gain, the
increase in value that both parties can realize from settlement of conflicts. Again,
the increases in value can occur both in a market value context and in an intrinsic
value context. As to joint gain in monetary value, the most apparent joint gain is
suggested by the facts. Dynamic could funnel part of the purchase price for
Parker's shares into his lost wages claim. 3 By doing so, Dynamic received a
tax deduction in its favor and Parker could settle his total claims in an amount that
was favorable to him as well.13 1 Regarding intrinsic value, the author previously
pointed out the incongruity of Dynamic making a further entry into the export
market. This could have led Dynamic to sell its phase one rights or adopt a more
detached role in the development and marketing of the capacitance meter despite
its being less monetarily rewarding. As well, funds received from Parker in the
sale of phase one rights can be profitably used in research and development in the
domestic market area, an area Dynamic anticipated being more profitable.
Anytime issues are quantified, in the monetary sense or by use of a scoring
system where non-monetary issues are involved, the mathematical calculation 1of
32
all possible settlements and, particularly, the efficient frontier is possible.
Even if actual mathematical calculation is not possible, experimentation with
differing resolutions and calculating the benefit to each party helps in perceiving
greater opportunities for joint gain. In essence, the suggestion here is that parties

128. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 68, at 7-8.
129. General Information, supra note 53, at 3; Plaintiffrs Instructions, supra note 68.
130. Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 4-5.
131. Id
132. RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 133-38, 148-54, 160-64.
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do not always need to calculate the efficient frontier. 3 3 Rather, parties can
experiment with various potential settlements until they comprehend the greatest
joint gains possible.
Again, conflicting parties must rememberthat several efficient settlements are
available to solve their disputes. How they apportion the value created goes to the
issue of fairness. Once Parker and Dynamic create value, they will need to
negotiate the issue of fairness.
The issue of fairness creates a bridge between the objectives and the process
of joint gains. Whether parties will engage in the process of joint gains largely
depends on their perception of being treated fairly. 134 If they feel other parties
will treat them fairly, they will more likely postpone their competitive, valueclaiming behavior and engage in creating value.'35
Of course, the process ofjoint gains involves the matching of complementary
values. 36 The matching of the complementary values in the purchase of shares
and the wage loss claim is a good example. 37 Essentiallby jointly solving the
two issues, both parties gain an advantage over the separate negotiation of the
issues. Another example of matching complementary values is found in the
negotiation between Parker and Dynamic over the covenant not to compete and
the opportunity for a joint venture marketing the capacitance meter. If Dynamic
wanted to obtain funds through the sale of the company's phase one rights to
enable it to conduct further research and development, the company might also
have permitted Parker to compete against it. Again, a natural linking occurs in the
discussion between these two issues.
The matching of complementary values can become much more complex than
suggested by the illustrations set out above. Parker can trade off a gain in one or
more matched sets against Dynamic's gain in one or more other areas. Thus, the
potential for creating value can continue along increasingly complex lines and
create greater opportunities for joint gains among the parties.
The necessity for truth-telling and full disclosure is paramount. In the
negotiation case example, imagining that the parties or their negotiators might act
strategically and misrepresent the truth or fail to give full disclosure is not
difficult.' 38 This strategic behavior results from the fear of being exploited by
the other party.'39 For instance, Dynamic may be hesitant to fully reveal its

133.

Id at 139-42; LAX & SEBENTrS, supra note 6, at 4.

134.
135.
136.
137.

LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 150-52.
Id.
Id. at 42, 92-93, 105.
Parkerv. Dynamic, supra note 52; Defendant's Instructions, supra note 65, at 4-5.
RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 142-45; LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at

138.

139-41.
139. Id. My perception is that both cooperative negotiators and aggressive negotiators make
strategic decisions based on the fear of being taken advantage of, though their point of reference
differs. An aggressive negotiator fears he or she is being taken advantage of if they do not claim as
much as they can; cooperative negotiators generally fear that their good natures will be exploited and
they will get tied up in creating value and neglect claiming it.
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available tax deduction on reasonable compensation paid to Parker. Parker may
take the information and use it to justify heightening his demands or simply
holding firm to his position. After all, if the settlement is going to cost Dynamic
less than anticipated, why shouldn't Parker claim some of that value?
Likewise, Parker may be reluctant to inform Dynamic about his offer of
employment from one of Dynamic's competitors. This fact may only make
Dynamic more insistent that they obtain a covenant not to compete as part of any
settlement. Parker's present employment does not directly compete with it, but
if he has an immediate opportunity to compete against Dynamic, the company may
feel inclined to entrench its position.
The purpose of this section is to illustrate some ideas about joint gains. The
problem of Dynamic and Parker allows readers to explore the many facets ofjoint
gains. One of the best ways to comprehend the facets of joint gains is to observe
a negotiation of the problem where the parties or negotiators only know their own
relevant facts. Observing the behavior of the negotiators and assessing the
differing settlements that occur would be interesting and instructive.

IV. POST - SETTLEMENT SETTLEMENTS
As stated earlier, post-settlement settlements is an idea or process developed
to enhance the realization of joint gains and, where possible, achieve efficient
agreements. 4 ' As Howard Raiffa, the originator of post-settlement settlements,
has observed:
[W]e must recognize that a lot of disputes are settled by hard-nosed,
positional bargaining. Settled, yes. But efficiently settled? Often not.
Both sides are often so intent on justifying their individual claims that
not much time is spent on creating gains to be shared. They quibble
about sharing a small pie and often fail to realize that perhaps the pie
can be jointly enlarged. Even where there is a modicum of civility and
some cooperative behavior on the part of the negotiators, it is not easy
to squeeze out joint gains. 4 '
Consequently, the preceding discussion of joint gains needs to be kept firmly in
mind and used to evaluate whether post-settlement settlements can further the joint
gains process.

140.
141.

Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
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A. ContractEmbellisher
To fully appreciate the concept of post-settlement settlements, one must
In The Art and Science of
understand what appears as its genesis.
42
Negotiation,' Howard Raiffa devotes an entire section to the discussion of
efficient settlements. In discussing the role of third party intervenors in furthering
joint gains and achieving efficient settlements, Raiffa suggests a type of intervenor
he calls a "contract embellisher," as follows:
I once invented a role for a rather unorthodox type of intervenor, whom
I called a "contract embellisher." Suppose that two parties are involved
in a complex negotiating deal. At some early stage in the negotiations,
when both sides fully understand the issues they are negotiating, the
contract embellisher interviews each side separately, confidentially, and
in depth about its needs, perceptions, value tradeoffs, and so on. He
then seals this information and retires from the scene until normal
contract negotiations are terminated. Knowing a great deal about each
side's beliefs, values, aspirations, and constraints, he is in a position to
ascertain whether they have arrived at an efficient contract -- a contract
that will not permit further joint gains. If they have not, the contract
embellisher attempts to devise an alternate contract, which according to
his calculations they would both prefer. But there may be slippage and
it is possible that he could be wrong. So next he asks each side
privately if it would prefer his suggested contract to the one already
negotiated. If both sides separately indicate that they would prefer his
proposal, then the change is consummated. There is no haggling about
the proposal: the parties can either take it or leave it. '43
Essentially, the suggestion requires a third party intervenor to use a
confidential relationship with each party to a conflict to obtain each party's true
values as to the items or situations in dispute.'" After the parties have
negotiated the best possible contract they can, the intervenor, at the request of the
parties, reviews the contract and further matches complementary values. 4 Due
to the intervenor's intimate knowledge of eachparty's true values, the presumption
is that the46intervenor can find further joint gains and, possibly, craft an efficient
contract. 1

Since the parties do not intend the intervenor's review of the contract to be
a re-opening of the negotiations, the embellished contract is presented in a take-it-

142.

RAIFFA, ART AND SCIENCE, supra note 1.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 221.
Id.
Id.
Id
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or-leave-it approach.'47 The rationale for this approach may also include some
protection for the intervenor. Finding more joint gains or crafting an efficient
agreement is not an exact science, and slippage, as Raiffa calls it, may occur. 4
Thus, the intervenor is not guaranteeing a more efficient agreement, but rather is
using analytical methods to enhance the agreement. Also, the parties may possibly
have already negotiated an efficient contract.
Here, then, is the beginnings of a new dispute resolution process that is
specifically designed to assist parties in conflict to realize all possible joint gains.
This concept finds further development, and perhaps its fullest development, in a
subsequent article by Raiffa.
B. Analytical Intervenor
In Post-Settlement Settlements,'49 Raiffa further develops the role of a
contract embellisher, now termed an "analytical intervenor,":
Here's one suggestion for how such intransigent negotiators might
be helped. Let them negotiate as they will. Let them arrive at a
settlement, or let a judge or jury impose a settlement on them ....
[O]ne protagonist might feel happy about the outcome - he got more
than he expected - but ... the other protagonist is unhappy - she did
not realize her just aspirations. But even in this case the negotiators
might not have squeezed out the full potential gains. There may be
another carefully crafted settlement that both ..
might prefer to the
settlement they actually achieved.
Now let's imagine that along comes an intervenor.. . and he asks
[the protagonists] after they have achieved their settlement if they would
be willing to let him try to sweeten the contract for each. The
intervenor carefully explains to [the protagonists] that [they] will have
the security of the outcome level ... already achieved but that [they]
may have the opportunity to do still better. The intervenor proposes
that after some analysis he will suggest an alternate settlement- a postsettlement settlement, if you will- that would replace the original
settlement only on the condition that both parties agree to the change;
and of course they would only do this if each prefers the new settlement
proposal to the old one. ...
Let's suppose that [one protagonist] is eager to cooperate with the
intervenor and that [the other protagonist] also reluctantly agrees, but
each side is not too happy about resuming face-to-face negotiations.
The intervenorproceedsby meeting separately with each side and doing
a careful, deep analysis of its interests and values, probing in particular

147.
148.
149.

Id
Id.
Raiffa, Post-SettlementSettlements, supra note 1.
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values that may be quite sensitive. The intervenor promises each side
not to reveal these confidentialities to the other (nor to anyone else),
and his promise is credible because of his existing reputation and his
desire to do business of a similar kind with others....
By the end of these deep-mapping exercises, the intervenor would
be privy to information that neither side had about the other. Now the
analytical task is clear. . . . There may be more than one new
settlement that would be better for each than the old one, and then the
intervenor would have a choice. Of course, he would then want to
select a settlement that would squeeze out all potential join gains.
Several choices might still then remain, but that possibility should not
detract from the scheme. How to find appropriate candidate settlements
becomes a mathematical optimization problem, and a host of techniques
can be employed to help the intervenor identify candidates and make his
selection.
Let's push on and assume that, on the basis of the information the
intervenor has elicited privately and confidentially from each of the
parties, he designs a new settlement that he believes each party will
prefer to the old negotiated (or imposed) settlement. He then proposes,
in a take-it-or-leave-it way, the new post-settlement settlement. Either
side has veto power. There's no bargaining. If both say yes, so be it.
If one says no, the old settlement prevails. That's the scheme....
Raiffa's idea for post-settlement settlements is obviously an extension of his
contract embellisher. Perceptively, Raiffa has recognized that parties negotiating
a contract are in conflict. As parties in conflict, they will eventually need to claim
the value they can create. The contract embellisher, an intervenor having the
confidences of the conflicting parties, controls both the creation and allocation of
value.'
The concept invites itself to other types of conflict, including family
disputes, business disputes, and estate disputes.'
Thus, the enlarged concept
of post-settlement settlements emerges.
Post-settlement settlements also recognize that some parties probably cannot
negotiate a settlement. However, this should not impede the use of an
intervenor.'
The parties can use the intervenor following any resolution of a

150. Id. at 9-10.
151. A marked difference is noticeable between Raiffa's contract embellisher and analytical
intervenor. Even as the change in name of the third party suggests, Raiffa puts his ideas in the broader
context of conflicts and settlements rather than deals and contracts. Other language used notes the
extension of his ideas to a broader, much more inclusive concept of conflicts. RAIFFA, ART AND
ScIENcE, supra note 1, at 221; Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9-12.
152. These are specific examples of situations that might utilize post-settlement settlements, as
envisioned by the broader, conflict-based context of the intervention proposed by Raiffa. See supra
note 153.

153.

Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9.
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Perhaps, then, a
conflict, whether such a resolution is voluntary or imposed.'
better term for the process might be "post-resolution settlement," since settlement
usually implies voluntary agreement and consensual resolution of a problem.'"
Interestingly, Raiffa does not repeat the requirement that the intervenor gather
information from the parties before they have reached a resolution. 156 Instead,
the intervenor gathers the information following the settlement.'
C. Comments on Post-settlement Settlements
Following Raiffa's article, two specific responses were made to PostSettlement Settlements. The approaches taken by the authors of these comments
are quite different, one is prescriptive and the other is descriptive, 58 but both
provide significant insight into the area.
1. Suitability to Multi-Party Conflicts
The first article, Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement
Settlements, 1 9 proceeds on the basis that the "use of mathematical models in the
study of negotiation... [can] make certain kinds of insights precise, permitting
a systematic exploration of their implications."'' " Specifically, the author, Alvin
E. Roth, uses mathematical models to buttress Raiffa's contention that two-party
negotiations in complex situations frequently fail to realize a significant amount
many opportunities to
of joint gains, and that an analytical intervenor can expect
16
achieve a more efficient post-settlement settlement.'
Support for Raiffa's contention springs from three conclusions reached by
using mathematical models. 62 First, mathematical calculations show that as the
number of issues in a conflict increase, the total number of possible settlements

154. Id
155. See "settlement" in WEBsTEI'S NEW WORLD DICIONARY 1304 (2d ed. 1980). Settlement
is defined as an agreement, arrangement, or adjustment Such language implies the consensual nature
of a settlement, though a stricter, technical definition may not imply the same meaning. Raiffa himself
uses settlement in the more common usage suggested, since his post-settlement settlement requires both
parties to accept the alternate settlement presented; a consensual, voluntary resolution. RAIFFA, ART
AND SCIENCE, supra note 1, at 221; Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9-10.
156. RAIFFA, ART AND ScIENcE, supra note 1, at 221.
157. Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9.
158. Gerald R. Williams has said, "A prescriptive approach says, 'This is how it ought to be
done.' A descriptive approach says, 'I have examined large numbers of experienced dispute resolvers
and this is how they do it; here are the characteristics and patterns of highly effective negotiators."'
NEGOTIATION STRATMOM, supra note 8, at 151.
159. Alvin E. Roth, Some Additional Thoughts on Post-Settlement Settlements, 1 NEGOTIATION
JOURNAL - ON THE PROCESS OF DIsPtJm SETTLEMENT 245 (1985).
160. Id at 245.
161. Id at 245, 247.
162. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss1/6

20

1996]

Mendenhalt: Medenhalt: Post-Settlement Settlements:
Post - Settlement Settlements

increases dramatically. 63 This is due to the myriad of new potential settlements
created by the matching of complementary values. Second, the calculations also
show that as the number of issues increases, the increase in non-efficient
settlements is disproportionately greater than the increase in efficient
So, the probability that the parties will choose non-efficient
settlements.'
settlement from the total set of potential settlements also increases.
By combining these two conclusions, one can predict that even though
multiple issues increase the number of possible settlements to a conflict. 65 The
chances that conflicting parties will reach an efficient resolution decreases.'"
Hence, the analytical
intervenor's opportunity to create a more efficient, or Pareto
"optimal",' 67 post-settlement settlement increases.'"6
An excerpt from the article helps to solidify the idea:
[W]hen there are only two parties to the negotiations . . . , the
percentageof possible Pareto optimal settlements on average will be less
than 30 percent when there are 10 possible settlements (i.e., the
expected number of Pareto optimal settlements will be 2.93. This
percentagewill drop to less than 1 percent when there are 1000 possible
settlements. If it is costly to evaluate possible settlements, and if
strategic considerations prevent the negotiators from frankly revealing
their preferences, then the possibility that the final outcome of
negotiations will not be Pareto optimal can be expected to increase as
the percentage of Pareto optimal settlements declines. Thus the
probability that mutually profitable post-settlement settlements can be
found is potentially very large when there are many possible
settlements.' 69
The third conclusion is that opportunities for more efficient post-settlement
settlements decrease as the dispute expands from a two-party dispute to a multiparty dispute. 7 ' Continuing in the article, Roth states:
The situation is quite different as the number of negotiators grows.
This can be understood by noting that, the larger the number of
negotiators with independent interests, the harder it is to propose a
change from one settlement to another that all regard as an improvement
... [Tihe case of three negotiators.., is already significantly different

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id at 245-46.
Id at 246.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 23.
Id
Id
Id at 247.
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from the case ...[of two negotiators]. And by the time we reach the
case ... [of fifteen negotiators], the expected percentage of Pareto
optimal settlements is over 98 percent even when there are as many as
1000 possible settlements. Even if the negotiators choose a final
outcome entirely at random, the likelihood of selecting one that could
not be mutually improved upon by a post-settlement settlement would
be overwhelming. This is of course in stark contrast to the situation
that exists when there are only two negotiators. 7'
The obvious conclusion from the mathematical model, and the prescription for
in
post-settlement settlements, is that this type of intervention is most successful
12
multi-issue disputes with a small number of parties, generally two or three.
2. Effective Working Relationships and
Post-Settlement Settlements
The stated purpose of the article Post-Settlement Settlements in Two-Party
Negotiations4" is to extend the concept of post-settlement settlements "by
arguing that, in complex two-party relationships, the creation of . . . [postsettlement settlements] (without the help of a third party) should be viewed as part
of an effective working relationship."' 74 Some negotiations, it is argued, cannot
These types of situations are
achieve an efficient agreement, at least initially.'
familiar to lawyers and other service providers. A client consults the service
provider concerning a complex problem, but has only limited information and
insists, in order to save costs, on negotiating the fee up front. 76 As the article
puts it:
[T]he full nature of an agreement will often be unspeciflable until the
work begins. The consultant, for example, can often be trapped by a
Catch-22 since he or she cannot know the true problem without
providing a great deal of service. In effect, a consultant cannot begin
the project without knowing what the project is, and cannot know what

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Max H. Bazerman et al., Post-Settlement Settlements in Two-Party Negotiations, 3
NEGOTIATION JOURNAL - ON THE PROCESS OF DISPUTE SETTEMENT, 283 (1987).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. This problem is entirely understandable in the attorney-client relationship. Cost is an
important factor at the outset of the project, yet the lawyer, like a consultant, cannot assess the entirety
of the project or the impact that outside individuals may have on the process without beginning the
project For an abbreviated, but effective discussion of the fee dilemma and a good illustration of the
attorney-client discussion, see DAVID A. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH 23, 227-28 (1991).
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the project is without beginning the project. [Post-settlement
settlements] provide an approach of resolving this Catch-22.
Many negotiations will lead the parties into the trap . . . [of]
escalating their commitment to a flawed initial agreement .... '
The article describes three complex negotiations that occurred in three
separate offices of a national accounting firm.17
In each study, a client
approached the firm to solicit the services of the firm's consulting division.' 79
After an initial consultation, the firm developed and implemented a plan in each
circumstance."
But as problems developed within the plan or as the plan was
completed and the projects took on greater dimensions, the firm and the clients
were forced to look at their relationship. 8 ' They had to determine if the
"consultant-client" relationship extended to the new problems or if a new
relationship of "extended service provider-client" needed to be formed." This
reevaluation of the relationship is viewed as a post-settlement settlement process.
After examination of the three cases, the authors of Post-Settlement
Settlements in Two-Party Negotiations come to several conclusions. First,
complexity of the tasks undertaken and limited information as to the entirety of
the project were the two main reasons a less than efficient agreement was initially
reached. 3 Second, when the opportunity arose for a post-settlement settlement
process, the successful parties initiated the negotiating process and the structures
in place encouraged them to seek one another out to resolve the problem."
Third, complexity is a critical aspect of all three cases.8 5 Generally, the needs
of the client were complex and difficult to put in terms of finite services, thus
making it difficult for the client exactly to enunciate the problem and for the firm
to comprehend the problem and understand what services were required. In a
word, the full nature of the agreement was not definitive until the work progressed
and the firm could evaluate the full needs of the client' 8 6 This extreme
complexity, which is typical of, though not exclusive to, service contracts, creates
a real dilemma for both the client and the finn. 87 The client generally does not
understand the problem. If he did, he probably would not seek out consulting
services. Further, the consultant does not know the problem as the client cannot
explain it to him fully and the consultant cannot know the problem without

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Bazerman et al., supra note 174, at 291.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 285, 287-288.
Id. at 285, 287-89.
Id. at 285-87.
Id. at 286-90.
Id. at 290.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
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settlements process is ideal to
beginning the project.1 " The post-settlement
89
resolve this dilemma or conflict.1
In each study, the ability or inability of the fimn and the client to "manage
was critical
and/or facilitate the dyadic [post-settlement settlement] process"''
to the success or failure of the ongoing relationship. The authors make several
suggestions as to the best methods for handling opportunities for a post-settlement
settlements process.'9 ' First, train individuals"9 who often negotiate these
types of agreements to consider a post-settlement settlements process. 9 3 In other
words, our business culture needs to understand that reopening matters is
appropriate, despite a propensity not to reopen settled matters. Part of this
training should include instruction in creating joint gains and a caution against
escalating commitment to an agreement that is not worldng. 9 '
The second suggestion is to create structures to monitor the feasibility of the
agreement. The parties need to ask whether the agreement is still working for
95
them. 1
The last suggestion is specifically directed at lawyers and negotiators who are
responsible for drafting such agreements. 96 Simply stated, the suggestion is:
Contracts can be finm, but
Write in the post-settlement settlement process!"
they also need the flexibility to deal with the ever-widening scope of an ongoing
relationship. 9 If the contract has an explicit provision directing the parties
toward a post-settlement settlement process," 9 then hopefully, they can use the
process to solve the problem instead of heightening their commitment to a nowflawed agreement.200

188. See discussion supra note 40.
189. Bazerman et al.,
supra note 174, at 291.
190. Id at 284.
191. Id. at 291.
192. Some examples would be lawyers and their clients, managers, consultants and other
professionals.
193. Bazerman et al., supra note 174, at 291.
194. Id
195. Id.
196. Id
197. Id
198. Id
199. Some may argue that the parties can simply replace the old agreement with a totally new

agreement In fact, the authors recognize this argument, but do not offer arguments in defense of
having post-settlement settlement processes included inthe initial agreement My responses are that
first, a new contract, at least symbolically, begins the relationship anew. Thus, many matters already
settled are up again for renegotiation and there is no default position as both hAe agreed to rescind
the old agreement To use a trite phrase, it is taking a step backward to take two steps forward. The
old agreement is not entirely flawed and a simple step forward is all that is needed.
Second, commitment to the initial agreement is lessened during the period that a new agreement
is being negotiated. This may result in harm to the relationship and may create a loss of time in
moving ahead with the fundamental aspect of the relationship.
200. Bazerman et al, supra note 173, at 291.
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3. Neutral Intervenor

Raiffa's latest comment on post-settlement settlements is found in the book
NEGOTIATION: STRATEGIES FOR MuTuAL GAIN: THE BASIC SEMINAR OF THE
PROGRAM ON NEGOTIATION AT HARvARD LAW SCHOOL.2 °1 In his chapter
entitled The Neutral Analyst: Helping Parties to Reach Better Solutions, Raiffa
takes a different approach to post-settlement settlements than he has taken in his
previous writings. His latest work is much more focused on the process of postsettlement settlements than on the role of the intervenor. That is, the discussion
of post-settlement settlements is much less an attempt to carve out a new role for
a specialist intervenor than it is an attempt to introduce a new tool of intervention.
An interesting aspect of Raiffa's discussion in this chapter is the example he
uses to illustrate the post-settlement settlements process.20 2 The negotiation case
example is drawn from Raiffa's own experience as an intervenor. Two brothers
who received, as a bequest from their mother, a large and valuable art
collection 0 3 were to share the art collection equally.20 4 .Though the brothers
were socially friendly, they were intensively competitive in matters ofbusiness and
the like.20 5 Dividing the art collection took on an air of competitive bargaining
and, despite the brothers' desires to be fair, their personal motivations made them

unable to negotiate the division.20 6 The brothers approached Raiffa to generate
an efficient resolution to the conflict. 0 7

An interesting aspect of this case is the analytical process that Raiffa used to
achieve an efficient agreement. He says:
Up to this point, we never discussed preference for particular
items. When we finally came to the point of dividing up the paintings,
I communicated with each of them confidentially in order to get lots of
information. I asked each of them to do whatever they found natural;
to write long letters telling me how they felt about the pieces and the
rationale behind these feelings. I asked that they use any system they
wanted to measure the strength of their preferences, including rankings
or numbers.
I collected this information to determine whether compatible deals
could be arranged that could balance the need for equity across artists
and equity in fair market values. Occasionally, I had to get more
information from them. I put all this information into a spreadsheet on
a computer. After analyzing all the information they had given me, I

201. NEGOTIATIoN STRATEIES, supra note 8, at 14.
202. Id. at 19-21.
203. Id at 19.
204. Id
205. Id at 19-20.
206. Id. at 20.
207. Id
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made suggestions to them. This is the role of an analytic intervenor.
I would show them two allocations and ask them which one they
preferred and why. I then used this information to come up with a third
allocation to which they both agreed on. After it was all over, they
invited me to dinner to show me that they were still brothers. They
also agreed that in a couple of years they would go through another
round of trading. They also awarded me a bonus because their
relationship did not deteriorate during the process.20 8
The post-settlement settlements process used by Raiffa departs significantly
from the process described in his previous writings. The boundaries for postsettlement settlements have expanded and, though Raiffa still relies on analysis to
reach an efficient settlement, no preexisting, negotiated settlement between the
brothers is available to use as a default position.2° Or, if there is, it is a very
minimal agreement by the brothers that they want a settlement process that
eliminates competitive bargaining and results in an equitable, efficient
agreement.2 "° Such a minimal agreement is more an agreement in principle, an
agreement as to the character of the settlement, and not its substantive provisions.
Obviously, Raiffa felt that there was enough of an agreement to go on with apostsettlement settlements process.
Another interesting twist is Raiffa's seeming departure from the strict "takeit-or leave-it" approach."' Raiffa suggests two possible settlements to the
brothers and obtains their reaction. This information is then used to "fine tune,"
in a sense, the analytical information that Raiffa has already received from his
deep-mapping exercises.2 12 Finally, the third alternative is proposed and
accepted as the post-settlement settlement. 13 Certainly, the basics of analytical
intervention are present in this process, but it is not a strict adherence to the plan
for post-settlement settlements.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id at 21.
Id. at 20.
Id
Id at21.
Id.
Id
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V. COMMENTARY AND SUGGESTIONS

Having now canvassed the concept of post-settlement settlements as set out
by Raiffa and other writers in the area of negotiations, this section will comment
on the concept of post-settlement settlements, both to challenge and build upon the
concepts that have been put forward. Of course, any critical comment is not
complete without an attempt to suggest improvement or development.
Consequently, the article will make recommendations to assist third party
intervenors in carrying out post-settlement settlements.
A. Concept or Procedure?
From a review of literature discussing post-settlement settlements, this
settlement techniques has evidently evolved from a procedure to more of a
concept." 4 For instance, the contract embellisher and the analytical intervenor
have specific roles and procedures laid out for them. However, as Bazerman so
forcefully points out, post-settlement settlements is a natural part of an ongoing,
working relationship. t ' Thus, there is a shift in the discussion of Raiffa's
neutral intervenor from role and procedure to a greater concern for the concept of
a third-party
intervenor using analytical methods to further the realization of joint
6
21

gains.

This is a healthy development that will lead to the innovative use of postsettlement settlements in other procedures. For instance, the concept could be used
in a procedure termed mediation-intervention (med-intervention). Originally, the
author developed this procedure in response to the concern for the extra expense
that an analytical intervenor would add to the process, thus making it a procedure
for wealthy disputants only. Med-intervention is a spin-off of classic mediationarbitration (med-arb). Following mediation, whether it results in a settlement or
not, the mediator undertakes a post-settlement settlements procedure. Since the
mediator already has intimate knowledge of the conflict and the parties' values,
no expense is incurred by a new third-party intervenor gathering information. The
mediator, come intervenor, would propose a more efficient agreement with the
same take-it-or-leave-it approach. Undoubtedly, some would argue that it is
difficult to have an intervenor shift from the role of a mediator to that of a neutral
intervenor. However, the shift would not be any more difficult than the shift
required in the med-arb situation.

214. Note the progression from a tight procedural role in a specified conflict, the contract
embellisher, to the procedurally looser and broader-based conflict resolution role of an analytical
intervenor. See previous discussion on this point, supra note 153. In THE NEUTRAL ANALYST:
HELPING PARTIES REACH BETTER SOLUrIONS, Raiffa's language noticeably shifts from labelling the
intervenor to speaking of the process, i.e., the term "neutral analysis," is the focus. NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 18-19.
215. Bazerman et al., supra note 174, at 281, 283.
216. See previous discussion, supra note 215.
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B. Confidentiality:A Pitfallfor the Unwary
Confidentiality is perhaps the most critical presumption of post-settlement
settlements. Without confidentiality, no realistic expectation exists that the parties
will disclose sufficient truthful values that will enable the intervenor to craft a
more efficient settlement. But, the process itself eventually breaches this
confidentiality.
The scenario where an actual or perceived breach of confidentiality occurs
is not hard to imagine. Suppose that the parties have negotiated an initial
agreement in a very competitive manner - they strategically misrepresent facts and
they make only partial disclosure. Next, the intervenor enters the scene and
carries out his deep-mapping exercises, and the parties, in contrast to their own
negotiations, give the intervenor full and truthful disclosure of all information. Of
course, the parties have given the information to the intervenor in confidence and,
in this scenario, confidence is critical as neither party wants the other to discover
its deception. How, then, does the intervenor craft a more efficient agreement that
does not disclose to all parties the deception they have played on each other?
Does the new settlement itself belie their true positions and reveal their true
values? Possibly, the relationships of the parties will worsen as each accuses the
other of having engaged in dishonesty. Eventually, the whole relationship,
including the initial agreement, could disintegrate due to the intervenor's
inadvertent disclosure of confidential information through the crafting of a more
efficient agreement.
The above scenario, which is not an unlikely one, presents some real
difficulties which arise in the confidentiality of negotiations. An acceptanceof the
possibility that a breach of confidentiality is somewhat inevitable means that
persons actually only anticipate post-settlement settlements to work where
cooperative negotiations have taken place, but, due to the parties' lack of
negotiating skills, an efficient agreement was not reached. Left out of the process
are those settlements that could most benefit from the process - settlements
resulting from hard, positional bargaining. This observation is the most disturbing
of all, since it strikes at the very heart of the process.
C. Truth-Telling and Disclosure
An outgrowth of the discussion on confidentiality is the assumption that
confidentiality will foster truth-telling and full disclosure - two activities essential
to achievingjoint gains.21 The question remains whether the confidential aspect
of post-settlement settlements will actually foster these types of activities. This
issue has not gone unnoticed by Raiffa.2"' His response is as follows:

217.
218.

LAX & SEBENus, supra note 6, at 30-32.
Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 11.
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Again in laboratory settings, I have asked many pairs of contending

players (after each pair has negotiated a settlement) whether they would
be willing to let a third party try to find a new settlement that would
jointly be preferred to the old settlement. Practically all subjects say
something to the effect of, "Why not, I have nothing to lose." A lot of
them consider how they might distort their values and interests to the
intervenor, but they then realize that it is not so clear how they should
falsify information to their advantage, and they end up by saying that
they would disclose their value tradeoffs as truthfully as possible. Let's
suppose that Mr. A discloses his interests to the intervenor in a distorted
fashion and that the intervenor then succeeds in finding a postsettlement settlement he believes A should prefer to the old settlement
according to the values A has stated. If this post-settlement is in reality
worse for A than the old settlement, then A will reject the offer. On
the other hand, A might get a better final settlement by providing the
intervenor with false information, but as I said, how to distort
information to one's advantage is far from clear. It is simply prudent
to tell the truth.
Raiffa's thoughts on the parties' views seem too optimistic. The rationale for
assumingnon-strategicbehaviorin the post-settlement settlementsprocess is rooted
in the complexity of the process - or the stupidity of the clients, that they will not
understand how to work the process to their advantage. However, practical
experience has shown that assuming the stupidity of a client is unwise. Further,
it might be especially unwise in the context of post-settlement settlements. Like
any other advisor, an intervenor will need to simplify the process to help parties
formulate realistic expectations. But, must they also assure the process is
complicated enough that they should not attempt to act strategically as it may
backfire on them?
To add more fuel to the fire of criticism, the rationale also ignores other
reasons that may influence parties to engage in the process. As in mediation, a
party may engage in post-settlement settlements to appease another party or to
keep up the appearance of cooperativeness. Any of these reasons may militate
against the party acting cooperatively since they have no real concern for the
success of the process.
D. Impact upon the Parties
1. Expectations of the Parties
Whether the third-party intervenor is called a contract embellisher, analytical
intervenor, or neutral intervenor, there is no doubt that the intervenor who embarks

219.

Id
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In
on a post-settlement settlement process is not the usual type of intervenor.
efficient
a
more
facilitates
some respects the intervenor is a mediator who
settlement, but in other ways the intervenor is much more like an advisory
2
arbitrator who uses more directive methods to achieve greater joint gains.
Consequently, the intervenorthat uses post-settlement settlements cannot be easily
classified as either a mediator or an arbitrator.
Inability to classify the intervenor has two consequences. First, the
expectations of the parties must be considered.222 If the expectation is that the
intervenor will simply facilitate a settlement in the classic mediation style, the
analytical methods used by the intervenor and the take-it-or-leave-it approach will
be perceived as too directive. On the other hand, another party may expect the
intervenor to act in an adjudicatory role and reach an agreement based on fairness
or legal principles. Since the intervenor is limited to a certain subset of efficient
agreements by the initial settlement of the parties, the intervenor may not be able
to select a settlement which is fairer to the parties. 3 Thus, a party expecting
adjudication on legal or fairness principles may not be able to have this
expectation fulfilled, being cut-off by the initial agreement.
This consequence of the parties' expectations canbe overcome to some extent
by education. The intervenor would need to explain the post-settlement
settlements process in some detail to the parties and, particularly, explain the
realistic and attainable objectives of the process. False expectations of pure
facilitation or of adjudication on legal or fairness principles should be dispelled.
Most importantly, any explanation should emphasize that the objective is to craft
a more efficient agreement than they already have and this necessarily entails no
loss of the gains made in the initial settlement.
The second consequence is that the parties may possibly want an intervenor
who is neither a mediator nor an adjudicator. Rather, they may want an intervenor
that overarches all the roles and employs all the methods that are available to an
224
Categorizing intervenors may
intervenor, regardless of categorization.

supranote 1, at 221.

220.

RAIFFA, ART AND ScIENC,

221.

Id. (where quite directive measures are taken by the contract embellisher.). However, see

NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES, supra note 8, at 19-21. (where Raiffa, in his example, acts more as a

mediator).
222.

In any client-centered counselling, the client's expectations as to the dispute resolution

process, including the expected role of an intervenor, are important Such expectations can either assist
or inhibit the dispute resolution process. If the expectations inhibit resolution, we may need to
examine the structure of the resolution process and determine if it creates the inhibiting expectation.
For a good discussion of client-centered counselling in the resolution process, see BINDER ET AL,
supra note 177, at 19-22.
223. Recall that in Raiffa's post-settlement seilements, the initial setitment is the default
position. Therefore, any efficient settlement cannot allocate value to one party at the expense of
another. This may mean that the intervenor is limited in selecting a fairer settlement; as such a
selection is cut-off by the parties gain under the initial agreement
224. To a large extent, this observation comes from my experience as a lawyer. Even though
a lawyer is trained and experienced in litigation, the adversarial process, the client expects the lawyer
to use all available methods to resolve the dispute. This lead, quite naturally, to the lawyer attempting
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inadvertently suggest that their roles and methods are confined to the terms that

are used to categorize them. However, disputes do not occur within neat
categories; rather, they occur across a continuum of the dispute resolution
processes. The parties may begin to resolve a dispute initially with avoidance and
afterwards move within the continuum of the primary dispute resolution processes
of negotiation, mediation, and arboitration. My perception is that parties to a

dispute are not constricted by the categorizations of dispute resolution processes
needing resolution throughout the continuum of
and see a dispute as it is, that22 is,
5
dispute resolution processes.

2. Parties' Commitment to the Settlement
Lastly, a concern needs to be raised as to the parties' commitment to the new

efficient agreement following a post-settlement settlements process. Parties who
resolve conflicts through consensual processes have a higher degree of
commitment to the terms of the settlement. In post-settlement settlements, the
parties likely have attained this higher degree of commitment to the initial
The
settlement, 26 especially if the settlement is of a consensual nature.2'
question, then, is: Does a post-settlement settlements process diminish the parties'
commitment to a settlement?
The argument that the commitment of the parties is diminished is quite
simple. The intervenor assumes some degree of decision-making responsibility in
a post-settlement settlements process. Thus, the consensual nature of the process
is lessened as is the parties' commitment to the outcome.
The argument against this position is that the parties still retain full authority
to reject or accept the new, efficient agreement. Thus, the process remains fully
consensual.
Both arguments have merit. The first argument is especiallyvalid where the
parties' initial settlement is quite inefficient or the intervenor seeks to construct

to negotiate a resolution to the dispute, and, depending on the lawyer's inclination and experience, to
perhaps employ other resolution techniques.
This observation is confirmed in resolution literature. For instance, negotiation, mediation, and
adjudication are seen as the primary processes of dispute resolution. STWP-EN B GOLDBERG Er AL,
DIsprE RESoLurIoN: NEGoTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTM PRocESS.S 1(2nd ed. 1992). However,
several methods may be borrowed from the primary processes to accommodate client desires or
situations. Thus, hybrid dispute resolution processes develop. Id. at 1, 223-39.
225. My observation is that the expectation of the Qlient that a lawyer employ l dispute
resolution processes is a source of client discontent with a lawyer. The lawyer, as a specialized dispute
facilitator/mtervenor, often is not familiar enough with other dispute resolution processes to employ
them or to advise the client on their use. Thus, the lawyer adheres to the processes best understood
by him or her, and frustrates the client's expectations of efficient resolution of the dispute.
226. Supra note 1, at 8, 154-55.
227. Post-Settlement Settlements, supra note 1, at 9-10.
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a settlement that is not only more efficient, but also fairer.2" In the first case,
that of a very inefficient agreement, the leap, so to speak, that needs to be made
to an efficient or near-efficient agreement may be so large that the parties feel that
it is not really an improvement upon their initial agreement, but a whole new
agreement. Thus, the new settlement is really perceived as a new, imposed
agreement. If so, the parties' commitment to the post-settlement settlement may
actually decline from its level in the initial settlement.
In the second situation, the intervenor may move to an efficient agreement
that clearly favors one of the parties. The intervenor has determines that a greater
apportionment of the value created by the process must go to one party in
229
accordance with equitable concepts (or the intervenor's sense of fairness).

This is not a suggestion that the gain or apportionment of value is made at
another's expense, but that additional value created by the process is allocated
unequally in the discretion of the intervenor. Such an unequal allocation is likely
to be apparent and, again, the parties may view the settlement as imposed and
experience a decreased commitment to the settlement.
In conclusion to the arguments regarding the commitment of the parties to
the solution, neither argument is wholly correct. Rather, they both point out
potential pitfalls for the intervenor and the intervenor needs to be aware of the
effect of his selection of an efficient settlement on the parties.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article examined the concept of post-settlement settlements in some
considerable length. Initially, it reviewed the idea of creating joint gains and set
out that post-settlement settlements emphasize the use of a confidential third party
intervenor to enhance the true and full disclosure of information vital to joint
gains. Post-settlement settlements do not overly concern themselves with the
fairness of settlements, leaving this aspect largely to the negotiation of the parties.
As well, the article reviewed the development of post-settlement settlements
from the roles of contract embellishers to neutral intervenors. This development,
by Raiffa and other writers, shows hope for the possibility of achieving more
efficient settlements through post-settlement settlements. As well, we have
observed the unfettering of post-settlement settlements from a set of procedures

228. If the parties have reached a rather inefficient agreement, the scope of the efficient frontier
from which an intervenor may choose a post-settlement settlement is significant Thus, does the
intervenor move to an efficient frontier that is directly "northeast" of the default position Or does the
intervenor move more northerly than easterly, or vice versa? This is the issue of fairness. Id. at 160163. See also ARTs AND SciENcEi, supra note 1, where Raiffa devotes an entire section to the issue
of fairness.
229. Note that the two situations presented are not mutually exclusive since a very inefficient
agreement opens up a much greater subset of more efficient settlements to the intervenor, consequently,
the intervenor has greater discretion within which to choose a "fairer" settlement.
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to a concept that can be applied with appropriate modifications to many
circumstances.
Lastly, some critique has been made of the assumptions underlying the postsettlement settlement process. Hopefully, the critiques do not dampen the
enthusiasm that dispute resolvers ought to have for using more analytical methods.
Rather, the suggestions for implementation of post-settlement settlements are
intended to make advocates of dispute resolution wiser and more innovative in
their implementation of this promising concept.
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